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Wenn der Flieger Air Berlin gehört hätte, wäre hier ne Menge mehr los....... :ironie: 
:aetsch:
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Erstes Flugzeugunglück des neuen Jahres
Mindestens drei Todesopfer
Zwischen 30 und 44 Menschen verletzt
Im westsibirischen Surgut kamen bei einem Brand an Bord einer Tupolev TU 154B2 (Reg.: RA-85588 ) der Kolavia, die mit 116 Passagieren und 8 Besatzungsmitgliedern an Bord nach Moskau fliegen sollte, drei Menschen ums Leben. Zwischen 30 und 44 weitere wurden durch Feuer und/oder Rauchgase verletzt, mehrere Personen davon schwer.
Unter den Passagieren befand sich russischen Medienberichten zufolge auch eine bekannte russische Musikgruppe.
Flug 7K 348 war gerade bei den Startvorbereitungen und befand sich auf dem Weg zur Startbahn für den Flug nach Moskau als eines der Triebwerke Feuer fing, welches von der Besatzung nicht gelöscht werden konnte. Daraufhin entschieden sich die Piloten zur sofortigen Evakuierung der Maschine.
Noch während die Maschine ausrollte, griff das Feuer allerdings vom Triebwerk auf den Rumpf des Flugzeuges über.
Unterschiedliche Angaben über Opferzahlen
Die Meldungen über die Zahl der Opfer sind unterschiedlich und liegen bei derzeit drei bestätigten Todesopfern und 30 bis 44 Verletzten, vier davon schwer, unter ihnen auch ein Kleinkind.
Augenzeugen berichteten von panikartigen Szenen an Bord der der Tupolev, während der Evakuierung soll einer der Treibstofftanks explodiert sein.
Die Ursache für das Feuer ist noch unklar und derzeit Gegenstand von Untersuchungen.
Über Kolavia
Kolavia wurde im Mai 1993 gegründet und betreibt zwei Hauptbasen, eine in Kogalym und eine Surgut. Darüber hinaus dient Moskau Domodedovo als Hub.
Die Airline bedient ausschließlich Ziele innerhalb der ehemalige Sowjetunion wie Krasnodar, Mineralnye Vody, Moskau, Samara, Surgut, Ufa und Baku.
Die Flotte bestand zuletzt aus zwei A320-200, die von Onur Air gemietet wurden, drei Bombardier Challenger 850, zwei TU 154B2 und vier TU 154M.
NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
December 31, 2010NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyo., the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.
The aircraft came to rest in hard packed snow about 350 feet beyond the runway overrun area. An initial inspection did not reveal any structural damage to the aircraft. Shortly after the aircraft came to a stop, in accordance with American Airlines' procedures, the pilots pulled the circuit breaker to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to preserve all of the recorded information for investigators.
The CVR and DFDR (digital flight data recorder) arrived at the Safety Board's recorder laboratory on Thursday evening, Dec. 30, where investigators were standing by to download the contents of both recorders. The CVR provided a two-hour recording of excellent quality audio; the voices of each of the pilots on the flight deck were clearly audible. The DFDR provided 1200 recorded parameters of flight data and captured the entire incident.
The crew, who were interviewed on Thursday evening, indicated that they saw the runway prior to reaching the minimum descent altitude before touchdown. Both crewmembers characterized the flight and approach to landing as uneventful prior to the runway overrun. The first officer was the flying pilot.
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the docket section of the NTSB website at http://go.usa.gov/rjR
PROTOCALS FOR TRANSPORTING AIRCRAFT RECORDERS IN INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
The Safety Board has long-established protocols for the handling and transportation of CVRs and DFDRs that contain recorded information from a commercial aviation incident, which by definition is one where no serious injuries or substantial damage to the aircraft or other property has occurred.
In such incident investigations, the Safety Board frequently asks the airline involved to transport the recorders on their own aircraft as such an arrangement often provides the most expeditious means of conveying the devices to Safety Board labs in Washington. The airline is instructed to transport the recorders without delay and without accessing the information contained within them by any means. This practice has worked efficiently and without complication for more than 40 years.
During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where American Airlines technicians downloaded information from the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.
"Although a thorough examination by our investigators determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board's standards of conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB investigation," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. "Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of American Airlines and excused them from further participation in this incident investigation."
American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full review of proper procedures and internal controls would be undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not repeated.
Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will provide American Airlines with any and all information needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.
Quelle!
Wow, starker Tobak! 
Da baut AA den DFDR aus, fliegt ihn nach Oklahoma, und lädt sich die Daten runter, bevor die NTSB das Ding zu Gesicht bekommen hat.
Das war auch noch nicht so oft da.
Ab jetzt ist Schluß mit lustig, und AA ist nicht mehr an den Untersuchungen beteiligt, und darf nur noch zuschauen.
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DCA04MA011
The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-05/01.
On December 18, 2003, about 1226 central standard time, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) flight 647, a Boeing MD-10-10F (MD-10), N364FE, crashed while landing at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, Tennessee. The right main landing gear collapsed after touchdown on runway 36R, and the airplane veered off the right side of the runway. After the gear collapsed, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. Of the two flight crewmembers and five nonrevenue FedEx pilots on board the airplane, the first officer and one nonrevenue pilot received minor injuries during the evacuation. The postcrash fire destroyed the airplane's right wing and portions of the right side of the fuselage. Flight 647 departed from Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California, about 0832 (0632 Pacific standard time) and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
The first officer was the flying pilot for that leg.
The captain and first officer remained in Oakland on December 17, with no flight duties assigned, then reported for duty on December 18 before the accident flight's scheduled departure time of 0810 (0610 Pacific standard time). The airplane's departure to MEM was delayed until 0832 because of a package sorting issue that was later resolved. The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain performed the nonflying pilot and line check airman duties......
.....The captain obtained the current MEM automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information and, about 1200:34, stated that the winds were out of "three twenty...sixteen gusts to twenty-two, so...it's more favorable to the three sixes." About 1202:08, the first officer stated, "I just think we should start putting out slats about twenty miles on the other side...because I'm...still fairly unfamiliar with Memphis, so I wanna get configured a bit earlier for that." The captain responded, "do what you want," and provided additional information about normal arrival operations, addressing typical stepdown and traffic pattern procedures, altitudes, airspeeds, and the probability of an early turn into MEM. The first officer acknowledged the information and requested the in-range checklist. About 1203:22, the captain stated, "you're driving and you stay focused on that and make me do whatever you need done." The first officer stated, "okay."
About 1204:46, the captain stated, "two ninety is the default descent speed. Which is just fine. That's what's in there." About 1205:22, the captain continued the in-range checklist, confirming altimeter settings with the first officer. About 1205:37, Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center advised the pilots to contact MEM approach control. About 1206:00, the captain announced that the in-range checklist was complete, then contacted MEM approach control. The MEM approach controller advised the pilots to expect to land on runway 36L and informed them that ATIS information Zulu was current. The approach controller cleared flight 647 to descend to and maintain 8,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The captain acknowledged the clearance and repeated "three six left" to the first officer.
About 1209:12, the captain advised the first officer that the winds were out of "three twenty at sixteen gusts to twenty two. Ten miles [visibility]. It's still saying wind shear." The first officer responded, "goodness." About 1210:46, the captain stated, "I don't see any other TCAS [traffic alert and collision avoidance system] targets...We may be the lead dog coming in here." About 1211:24, the MEM approach controller instructed the pilots to reduce the airplane's airspeed to 210 knots and then descend to and maintain 6,000 feet. Shortly after the captain acknowledged these instructions, the first officer asked him to confirm the clearance, and the captain repeated the instructions. The first officer repeated the airspeed restriction and asked the captain to extend the slats.
About 1212:11, the captain stated, "there's BOWEN [a navigational intersection]...one seventy five is the heading out of BOWEN." The CVR recorded the first officer as she responded, "oh, thank you." About 1212:42, the captain stated, "FREAZ [a navigational intersection] is out there fourteen miles from touchdown." About 1213:14, the captain stated, "airport's right there," and the first officer responded, "yep."
About 1213:18, the MEM approach controller advised the pilots to contact MEM approach control on a different frequency. About 30 seconds later, the captain contacted MEM approach control on the new frequency and advised the controllers that flight 647 was level at 6,000 feet. About 1214:15, the first officer requested 15° of flaps. About 1214:33, MEM approach control cleared the pilots to descend to and maintain 5,000 feet and turn 10° right. Afterward, the MEM approach controller advised the pilots that they should expect to land on runway 36R instead of 36L, as previously instructed.
About 1215:39, the captain told the first officer, "three six right's in the fix page and it's in the...FMS [flight management system]," and the first officer thanked him. About 1216:11, the MEM approach controller instructed the pilots to reduce the airplane's airspeed to 190 knots, and the captain acknowledged this instruction. The first officer called for the approach checklist about 1218:10, and the captain responded, "approach check. Briefing's complete to three six right. The altimeter is three zero one zero." As the captain finished speaking, the MEM approach controller instructed the pilots to turn left to a heading of 020° and intercept the localizer for runway 36R. The captain acknowledged the instruction, and the pilots continued the approach checklist, completing it about 1218:58.
About 1219:00, the captain stated that the localizer was "alive" and that they were 18 miles from touchdown. About 10 seconds later, the MEM approach controller told the pilots to reduce the airplane's airspeed to 170 knots and cautioned them about possible wake turbulence from an Airbus airplane that was about 6 1/2 miles ahead of the flight 647 airplane. The captain acknowledged the speed reduction and stated that he was looking for the Airbus airplane. About 1219:24, the first officer stated, "flaps twenty two please," and the CVR then recorded the sound of two clicks. About 1219:28, the captain stated, "I got an Airbus right there...and another one out there looks...about level with us." About 20 seconds later, the MEM approach controller cleared flight 647 to descend to and maintain 2,000 feet. About 1220:20, the captain advised the first officer that they had intercepted the localizer, adding, "we're not yet cleared for the approach." The first officer responded, "that's noted."
About 1221:00, the pilots told the MEM approach controller that they saw the airport. The approach controller then stated, "FedEx six forty seven heavy cleared visual approach runway three six right, maintain a hundred and seventy knots until MAGEE [a navigational intersection] and you can contact tower now." The captain acknowledged the clearance and switched to the MEM air traffic control tower (ATCT) frequency. About 1221:53, the MEM local controller stated, "FedEx six forty seven heavy, Memphis tower, number two following a heavy Airbus two mile final caution wake turbulence runway three six right. Gain and loss of ten [knots] short final runway three six right, cleared to land."
About 1222:31, the captain stated, "how 'bout four extra knots. I don't like to add extra speed, but you know, three or four knots can make a lot of difference...if you're bumpin' around back and forth." The first officer responded, "good enough...let's go with ah landing gear down. Before landing checklist, please...glideslope's alive." The captain responded, "Spoilers are armed. The gear's down...and three green. Flaps are twenty two. Flaps to go." About 1223:38, the first officer requested 35° of flaps, and the captain acknowledged and complied with this request. About 1223:52, the CVR recorded a single central aural warning system (CAWS) "tailwind shear" alert. The captain stated, "okay, it's all right," and the first officer stated, "goodness."
About 1224:27, the CVR recorded the CAWS callout "one thousand" as the airplane descended through 1,000 feet above ground level (agl). The captain then stated, "visual. Stable. We got a nine thousand foot runway...and we land at a hundred and forty six. A pretty good headwind oughta work out okay." About 1224:52, the first officer stated, "autopilot's coming off." About 1225:02, the captain stated, "checklist is complete. You're cleared to land," and the first officer responded, "thanks." Between about 1225:08 and about 1225:52, the CVR recorded the CAWS altitude alerts for 500, 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, and 10 feet agl followed by the sounds of touchdown about 1225:53. About 1225:56, the first officer stated, "wow," and the CVR recorded the sound of increasing background noise, similar to increased engine rpm, and the sound of rumbling that was increasing in volume.
About 14 seconds after touchdown (about 1226:07), the FDR data showed a lateral load factor of about 1.0 G as the right wing suddenly moved about 6° lower. About the same time, the CAWS "landing gear" alert began to sound, which repeated until the end of the recording. About 1226:25, the captain stated, "here we go," and the airplane began to veer off the right side of the runway. As the airplane veered to the right and came to a stop, a fire developed on the right side of the airplane. About 1226:30, the airplane came to rest in the grass on the right side of the runway. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight. The CVR recording ended when the pilots shut down the engines (thus stopping electrical power to the CVR) about 1226:41.
FINDINGS
1) The captain and first officer were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with, and had received the training and rest time prescribed by, Federal regulations and company requirements. The flight crewmembers possessed valid and current medical certificates appropriate for Part 121 flight operations.
2) Based on the available evidence, fatigue was not a factor in this accident. Although the cockpit voice recorder recorded the first officer coughing and clearing her throat numerous times, she stated that she was not sick, and there is no evidence that this (the coughing/clearing her throat) adversely affected the flight or her performance.
3) The accident airplane was properly certificated and maintained and was equipped and dispatched in accordance with applicable regulations and industry practices. There was no evidence of any preexisting powerplant, system, or structural failure.
4) The accident airplane's cargo and its loading were not factors in the accident.
5) Differences between the MD-11 and MD-10 handling characteristics during the landing phase were not an issue in this accident.
6) Air traffic control was not a factor in the accident.
7) The atmospheric conditions encountered during the approach and landing were within the performance capabilities of the airplane; there was no evidence of significant windshear.
The first officer did not properly apply control wheel and rudder inputs to align the airplane with the runway centerline or apply appropriate back pressure on the control column to arrest the airplane's rate of descent before touchdown; as a result, the airplane touched down extremely hard while still in a crab.
9) The captain, who was conducting a line check of the first officer, did not adequately monitor the first officer's performance during the final stages of the approach and landing at Memphis and failed to take or initiate corrective action to prevent the accident.
10) The excessive vertical and lateral forces on the right main landing gear during the landing exceeded those that the gear was designed to withstand and resulted in the fracture of the outer cylinder and the collapse of the right main landing gear.
11) A proactive program, similar in concept to FedEx's Enhanced Oversight Program, in which flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced training failures are identified and given additional oversight and training, would be beneficial to flight safety.
12) The nonrevenue FedEx pilot who opened the L1 emergency exit mistakenly pulled both the manual inflation and slide/raft disengage handles because he was not sufficiently familiar with their operation, thus separating the slide/raft from the L1 doorsill.
13) The guidance contained in the flight crew emergency training section of Federal Aviation Administration Order 8400.10 (Air Transportation Aviation Inspector's Handbook) is not adequate for principal operations inspectors to use in ensuring that emergency exit door/slide training for flight crewmembers is as comprehensive as that which cabin crewmembers receive and is as comprehensive as intended by the regulation.
14) FedEx's inadequate hands-on emergency procedures training and the differences between the trainer and the door/slide installation on the accident airplane contributed to the unintentional release of the slide/raft.
15) Most of the FedEx pilots on board the accident airplane showed poor judgment and exposed themselves to unnecessary risk when they delayed their evacuation from a burning airplane to salvage personal items.
16) The Rural/Metro Fire Department aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) response vehicles were unnecessarily delayed in providing ARFF assistance because the Memphis air traffic control tower ground controller did not give them priority over other nonemergency airport traffic; under other circumstances, this could have adversely affected ARFF efforts.
17) Air traffic control tower controllers should recognize the importance of relaying all available pertinent information, including airplane occupant information, to aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) personnel to assist them in ARFF efforts and decision making.
18 ) The required recorded flight data recorder data on the MD-10 should meet the rate, range, and accuracy requirements specified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Section 121.344, Appendix M.
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Video shot by a passenger aboard American Airlines Flight 2253 as it overran Ruwnay 19 at Jackson Hole, Wednesday, shows unusual operation of the aircraft's systems, according to some pilots. The 6,300 foot runway sits at an elevation of 6,451 feet and the pilots landed in light snow at about 11:37 am. About seven inches of snow had fallen in the area since midnight. The aircraft appears to be on the ground prior to passing the PAPI lights and wind sock. One pilot who commented on pprune.com suggested that places the landing point approximately 1,400 feet down the runway. In the video, the engine's thrust reverser panel first moves just after touch-down, but it does not fully open and the outboard spoilers are not visibly deployed. Because of that, things quickly get more interesting. Click through for the video.
A full ten seconds after touch-down, the thrust reverser panel moves from barely open to closed. The thrust reverser panel does not begin to re-open, this time fully, until approximately seven seconds later, 17 seconds after touch-down. The engines do not appear to spool up until roughly ten seconds after that. That means the 757 rolls on the runway for 27 seconds before the reversers appear amply engaged. It departs the end of the runway roughly nine seconds after that. Pilots who claim to be familiar with the 757 have left comments in professional pilot forums online stating that the thrust reversers on the 757 can sometimes refuse to engage. Others have speculated that a hydraulic problem or a problem with the Boeing's air/ground logic system could have prevented the spoilers and reversers from working properly. For this flight, no one was injured and the aircraft came to rest in packed snow, and still on its gear, about 350 feet beyond the runway overrun area. The NTSB is working the case and should have good cockpit voice and flight data recorder information already in hand. And we'll know if blame will be placed primarily with the crew, with the aircraft, or both.
December 31, 2010 - The National Transportation Safety Board has opened an investigation into an incident in which a passenger jetliner that had landed at Jackson Hole Airport in Wyoming failed to stop after touchdown on Thursday.
At about 11:38 AM MT on Thursday, American Airlines Flight 2253, a B-757 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.
The pilot reported that the braking system failed. Flight 2253 continued down the runway, passing the end of the runway and through the runway overrun area which was 300 feet. The aircraft finally came to rest about 350 feet from the overrun area in hard packed snow.
The pilot came on the intercom to reassure passengers that they were ok and stated that the brakes weren’t working properly. Airport officials brought in heavy plows and airport workers began plowing an area around the Boeing 757. A portable staircase and buses were brought in and it took just under an hour before all 181 passengers and crew were able to disembark the aircraft.
Aircraft can and do overrun the ends of runways, sometimes with devastating results. An overrun occurs when an aircraft passes beyond the end of a runway during an aborted takeoff or while landing. To minimize the hazards of overruns, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) incorporated the concept of a safety area beyond the runway end into airport design standards called “runway overrun area”.
To meet the standards, the safety area must be capable, under normal (dry) conditions, of supporting the occasional passage of aircraft that overrun the runway without causing structural damage to the aircraft or injury to its occupants. The safety area also provides greater accessibility for emergency equipment after an overrun incident. There are many runways, particularly those constructed prior to the adoption of the safety area standards, where natural obstacles, local development, and/or environmental constraints, make the construction of a standard safety area impracticable.
.......
The weather was reported to be snowing at the time of the incident. No damage to the aircraft has been reported. Senior NTSB Air Safety Investigator Joseph Sedor has been designated as the Investigator-In-Charge. At this time parties to the investigation are American Airlines, Boeing, the Allied Pilots Association and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Prost Neujahr!
Irre ich mich, oder waren die Spoiler gar nicht draussen?? Hat das Einfluss auf die Reverser?? Sitzen die microswitches in beiden Hauptfahrwerken??
Glück gehabt!
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Riesige Propeller-Maschine abgestürzt
In Zentralrussland ist ein Flugzeug des Militärs abgestürzt. Alle zwölf Besatzungsmitglieder der Transportmaschine kamen dabei offenbar ums Leben. Die Unglücksursache war zunächst unklar.
Moskau - Die Maschine verschwand einfach vom Radar: Beim Absturz eines Militärflugzeugs in Zentralrussland sind nach Angaben des Verteidigungsministeriums in Moskau mindestens zwölf Menschen ums Leben gekommen. Die riesige Transportmaschine vom Typ Antonow An-22 sei in der Region Tula rund 250 Kilometer südlich der Hauptstadt am Boden zerschellt. Die Ursache für den Absturz war zunächst nicht bekannt.
An Bord der 1974 in Dienst gestellten Maschine seien eine Crew und eine Ersatzcrew mit je sechs Piloten gewesen, meldete die Agentur Itar-Tass am Mittwochmorgen unter Berufung auf Behördenangaben. Rettungskräfte hätten am Absturzort in den Trümmern zunächst keine Überlebenden entdeckt. Zuvor war von elf Toten die Rede gewesen.
Das Transportflugzeug sei am Dienstagabend gegen 21.30 Uhr Moskauer Zeit (19.30 Uhr MEZ) von den Radarschirmen verschwunden, hieß es im russischen Verteidigungsministerium. Die Maschine war auf dem Weg von Woronesch nach Twer, als sie zwischen den Regionen Tula und Orel südlich von Moskau abstürzte. Der Vize-Gouverneur von Tula, Alexander Ewtejow, sagte laut RIA Nowosti, der Kontakt zum Cockpit sei abgebrochen. Vielleicht sei die Antonow zu einer Notlandung gezwungen gewesen.
Die Antonow An-22 ist mit vier Turboprop-Triebwerken das größte in Serie gebaute Flugzeug der Welt mit Propellerantrieb. Sie kann bis zu 290 Soldaten transportieren.
ore/dpa/AFP
Russian authorities have grounded Antonov An-22 and Tupolev Tu-95 aircraft following the crash of an An-22 during a training flight.
The giant four-engined transport aircraft came down near Troitskoye in the Tula region, in the southwest of the country.
Russia's defence ministry, in a statement, says the radar marker of the aircraft "disappeared from screens" at 21:30 Moscow time on 28 December.
Two search teams were dispatched to the point of impact and a cordon established, it adds. Rescue efforts have been complicated by poor weather conditions.
The defence ministry states that, in order to ensure safety, it is grounding aircraft types with similar engines - such as other An-22s as well as the Tu-95.
Flights have been "suspended" by the head of the Russian air force until the reason for the accident is determined, says the ministry.
An-22 aircraft were designed to be powered by the Kuznetsov NK-12 turboprop, with contra-rotating propellers.
Around 12 occupants were reportedly on board the aircraft, said to have been en route to the Migalovo military base in the western Tver province, and there is no indication of any survivors. The defence ministry has set up a commission of inquiry.
Flightglobalist die Quelle!
Nachfolgend sind zwei verschiedenen Pilot Reports zu finden, die sich mit nem sehr beeindruckenden FLugzeug befassen. Es wurden weniger als 50 Stück davon gebaut. Eigentlich verwunderlich, denn die Leistung des Flugzeugs ist auch heute noch mehr als konkurrenzfähig.
Mit ner neuen Avionic- Suite wie dem ProLine 21 oder dem Garmin G 3000 wäre dieses Flugzeug in der Lage, selbst mit nem CJ2 ( vielleicht sogar CJ3) zu konkurrieren.
Zuerst die technischen Daten:
Horsepower: 2X1000 Gross Weight: 12050 lbs
Top Speed: 351 kts Empty Weight: 7856 lbs
Cruise Speed: 334 kts Fuel Capacity: 3819.00 gal
Stall Speed (dirty): kts Range: 1879 nm
Takeoff Landing
Ground Roll: ft Ground Roll ft
Over 50 ft obstacle: 1930 ft Over 50 ft obstacle: 2280 ft
Rate Of Climb: 3242 fpm Rate of Climb (One Engine): 997 fpm
Ceiling: 41000 ft Ceiling (One Engine): 28700 ft
Less than 50 Cheyenne 400s were made before production terminated in 1992. I had been invited to fly South Africa's only example, ZS-PHO, a 1985 model. Compared to other business aircraft, the 400LS looks sleek and rakish.
The dominating features are the pair of broad Dowty Rotol propellers (whose diameter is the same as the chassis length of a long wheel base Land Rover). Although the undercarriage legs have been strengthened and lengthened, the props are huge paddle-blades with a ground clearance of a meagre eight inches. Studying the Pilot's manual shows that this is clearly a problem. Apart from the inevitable abrasion these blades will suffer when used on dirt airstrips, the clearance has important implications during ground handling. An STC has reportedly been approved for five bladed scimitar propellers from Hartzell, which apart from improving ground clearance, will increase the maximum speed by a remarkable 60 knots to well over 400 knots!
During the pre-flight walk about it is clear this is a Piper and not a Beechcraft product. PHO's age is beginning to show in the general fit of the panels and particularly on the fibreglass mouldings, which were beginning to craze. The heavily over-engineered solidity of Beech products seems to be lacking, most obviously when looking at the access panels which appear to be loose fitting. When checking the Garretts it is necessary to open a small hatch in each engine to examine the chip and fuel filter sensors. If they have been triggered and won't reset they are no-go items.
To accommodate the additional power of the engines under asymmetric conditions, the vertical tail has been enlarged so that, despite the aeroplane's low slung stance, the tail is higher than a King Air 90's. Handling is enhanced through counter-rotating engines. Access to the cabin is via a gas strut-supported airstair door behind the port wing. Front seat access is not the best due to the narrow cabin cross section and dominating centre pedestal. Once seated, the front office is very comfortable and the panel layout good with the pilot's side containg two EFIS screens. In the centre of the panel is an 18-inch colour radar screen and information on all three tubes can be interchanged should any of them fail. Hidden modestly in the airspeed indicator is a Mach meter!
The start sequence is fully automated. With 24 volts required, the pumps are turned on and the starter button is pressed. At 13% Ng, the engines light off and attention must then be shifted to the EGTs. These are redlines at 820 degrees C and it is necessary to have fingers poised over the fuel cut-off buttons should the temperatures exceed the 820 limit. In general, the only time this limit should be in danger of being exceeded is when the batteries are not fully charged or the aircraft is pointing downwind. Wind blowing straight down the large tailpipe makes it harder for the heat to disperse. The Garretts have sophisticated protection systems built in. Torque limiters protect the engines from injudicious applications of power and there are built in data recorders. These flag hot starts and other out of limits parameters as well as taking vital signs every time you push the button. This helps to maintain the engines on an on-condition basis.
With the post start checks complete, it was apparent the engines produce a high level of residual thrust, even at flight idle as the aeroplane was straining to move forwards. Taxiing is straightforward and with the checks complete we lined up on Lanseria's runway 06. Standard operating procedure is to then power up to 30 percent torque against the brakes. Apparently, any power setting above this will start sliding the tyres. The reason for this maximum 30 percent power setting becomes apparent from reading the last page of the manual under: 'Tips for operators'. The problem is essentially that of propeller clearance. As the power is increased, the nose wheel oleo compresses and clearance decreases.
The aircraft is not the easiest to keep straight on the centre line. However, as speed built up, so lateral stability improved and we were very quickly at rotation speed where a firm rearwards application of the column had the aircraft off the runway and heading up at an amazing rate of climb. At all phases of flight, the cabin noise was less than I remember it being in other turboprops. Piper's advertising blurb claims it is quieter than the business class section of a Boeing 727. The cabin is so well insulated, this claim might be true.
Holding the column with my left hand, I tried a gentle turn and was surprised by the heavy controls.
My first instinct was to check the autopilot wasn't on.
The stiff controls help to make the Cheyenne appear stable in all phases of flight but it was like trying to drive a car with the power steering switched off. Checking longitudal stability, I pushed the nose down initially with one hand and then two. With a 5 degree nose down attitude, I released the column and the nose obediently rose to the horizon and then beyond. It happily went into a 700 feet per minute climb. I didn't wait for the aeroplane to settle back to its cruise attitude, as it seemed the Cheyenne would continue to climb until it went orbital. A steep turn required a firm rearwards input on the column, but once established in the turn, the aircraft felt rock steady. Roll rate was fair.Being the sophisticated high performance aircraft that it is, the Cheyenne 400 is equipped with a stick shaker and pusher as well as a yaw damper. The flying characteristics at the stall are therefore academic as the stall is defined by the pusher forcing the nose down rather than the airflow breaking away from the wing. Better to see how the aircraft performed in the circuit. Turning for home I made an obvious mistake. I simply put the nose down. In a piston this is fine, it gets you home quickly and keeps the engines warm - but not in the Cheyenne. This is an aircraft that, thanks to its huge abundance of power, operates close to its redline Vmo speed as a matter of routine. Putting the nose down simply sent the airspeed round to the wrong side of the striped barber's pole at an indicated 270 knots indicated. I quickly pulled the power back to just 30 percent and even so we were in danger of exceeding the 250 knot speed limit drawing close to Lanseria.
The gear came out at 170 knots and then I made my second mistake by underestimating the space needed to make the final approach turn. After an inadvertent hammerhead I managed to hit 130 knots before applying full flap.. This brought the speed back to 125 knots or blue line, until crossing the fence at 110 knots. Due to the heavy controls, the aircraft needs to be correctly trimmed and fortunately trim input is minor during the final approach.
Pulling the power all the way back over the threshold, I needn't have worried about the highly loaded wing giving up flying suddenly. I held the nose up and waited for the Cheyenne to settle gently onto the runway. This is an aeroplane that floats thanks to its long low wing and residual thrust. Eventually the wheels touched in an almost level attitude, with the nosewheel following soon after the mains.
It is recommended that once the mains have contact, the nosewheel be lowered immediately and held down to stop the aeroplane from jumping back into the sky.
The Cheyenne 400 loves to fly.
I applied power and lifted the flaps for the go-around. Backpressure on the column gave an easy rotation despite our relatively forward C of G. The aircraft needed no forward input on the column following rotation unlike most T-tailed aircraft. On the crosswind leg, I pulled the power back to avoid busting the 6,000-foot turbine altitude circuit limit. Extending the downwind leg to accommodate slower traffic, I had plenty of time to configure the aircraft for another approach and made a rather better job of the second landing. Once down, the selection of beta mode was enough to slow us down quickly but comfortably without having to use reverse. With the big engines and propellers, reverse thrust has the ability to pile all the passengers up against the crew seats.
Back on the apron, we allowed the engines to idle for a few minutes to stabilise temperatures before holding the props against the beta stops and cutting the fuel supply. I was very impressed with the 400LS and we chatted with the owner for a long time about this impressive aeroplane and its capabilities. The huge power of this Piper has made this not just a hot rod special of limited utility but an aircraft of immense practical use. It is capable of taking as many people as a Citation I a far greater distance at a similar speed. The owner says that on a Lanseria to Luanda leg, the aircraft can carry more payload than a King Air 200. With 2,000lbs of fuel for four hours there is still capacity for another 2,200 lbs of passengers. Typical fuel burn at a high cruise level is 400lbs (60 US gallons) an hour - half that of a comparable Citation. With total useable fuel of 570 gallons, the aircraft can comfortably make Johannesburg to Mauritius non-stop.
Even compared to the original 'bionic budgie', the Boeing 737, the Cheyenne performs well. The Boeing takes about 18 minutes at gross weight to climb to flight level 330, the Cheyenne will climb to flight level 350 in just 16 minutes! In the hands of Chuck Yeager, the Cheyenne 400 holds all the time-to-climb records in its class. A Citation II takes six minutes longer than the Cheyenne to get to flight level 350. This means the 400LS gets to cruise speeds and low fuel burn rates quicker than pure jets and very much cheaper.
In conclusion, while Piper may have lost the race for pre-eminence in the construction of general aviation aircraft, they lost despite having some excellent products, despite the unlikelihood of ever seeing Piper rejoin the big business multi market again.
Kompletter Text und die Bilder gibts hier....
Ein Pilot Report aus den 80ern unter Praxisbedingungen!
Da hat es sogar eine Piaggio Avanti schwer, daneben herzufliegen.........
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Wobei der Einzelhandel aber kein höheres Wesen ist.....
December 29: The first images of China’s new fifth-generation fighter, the F-12/XXJ have been posted on Chinese internet forums and websites.
The aircraft is believed to have been developed by the Shenyang Airplane Corporation and has been heavily influenced by the Russian T-50/PAK-FA revealed late last year. The F-12 is expected to enter service with the People's Liberation Army Air Force in 2015, around the same time as the PAK-FA.
Nun bin ich leider kein Atheist, sondern Agnostiker.....
Immer noch nix. Weder von den Männern, noch von der Hexe..... :party: :hurra:
Möööp. Falsch!!! Sowas wird heute ganz einfach am "Facebook-Freunde-Status" überprüft... da sind Weihnachten und Geschenke doch schon laaaaaange überholt!
Na du hast aber nen hohen Tellerrand.... :zunge: :ironie:
Mit welchen Utensilien gelangt man denn in Facebook??
Oder hat man als Schüler schon die Kraft die finanziellen Mittel für die Anschaffung eines PCs, Laptops o. ä. zu stemmen??
Von wem kommt denn die Knete?? 
Das tut mir sehr leid für dich.
Braucht es nicht, wir wollten es ja alle so. Wir schenken uns zu Weihnachten nix. Erst wenn der Nachwuchs auf der Erde ist......
Ich finde das gehört dazu.
Warum?? Weihnachten ist im Grunde ne Geburtstagsparty für Jesus Christus, bei der sich die Gäste beschenken....
Man darf aber nicht vergessen, warum man feiert.
Wie viele wissen es denn noch?Ansonsten siehe oben...
Jemand, der nicht an Gott glaubt und Christ ist, braucht in meinen Augen auch kein Weihnachten feiern, die können sich an jedem anderem Tag beschenken.
Das kann ich als praktizierender Fan von Thomas H. Huxley und Protagoras auch, wenn nicht sogar besser. Ich kann es ohne Schuldgefühle.... :hurra:
Wenn du zu diesen Menschen gehörst, es nur konsequent, nicht zu feiern
Zu Weihnachten gehört jedoch genauso das Gebet, der Kirchenbesuch und das Familiäre, wie die Geschenke.
Ich habe doch gefeiert. Ich genoss die Gesellschaft meiner Schwiegereltern, meiner Freundin und ihrer Großeltern sowie meinem Schwager nebst Freundin. Am Heiligabend Würstchen , verschiedene Salate, und danach ein paar Stunden Rommé spielen.
Ich persönlich brauch nicht mehr. Für Manche ist die Art und die Anzahl der Geschenke anscheinend ein Gradmesser geworden, an dem man misst, wie sehr man geliebt wird. Und da ist der Zweck von Weihnachten verfehlt....
Nix bekommen, nix zu tauschen!
Weihnachten ist so herrlich stressfrei ohne Geschenke! 
:beer:
Wenn man nicht den Opa ins Krankenhaus fahren muß......
Hallo Guido, ich hoffe du hast die Feiertage einigermaßen überstanden.........
Hab gestern an dich denken müssen, und wünsch dir vor dem jahreswechsel alles Gute.
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